ESSAY

THE MEDIA EXEMPTION PUZZLE
OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS

SONJA R. WEST†
In the 2010 case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the
United States Supreme Court held that a federal law that placed some
restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures was unconstitutional.1 In
dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that in order to reach this conclusion
the majority had purposefully constructed a “newly-minted First
Amendment rule” designed to block any and all congressional attempts to
regulate this type of spending.2 He claimed, in essence, that the Court had
trapped Congress in a legislative box—a box that in campaign finance law is
known as the media exemption problem.
The problem is this: When attempting to address concerns about corporate
campaign expenditures (i.e., corporate political speech), Congress essentially
has two options. The first option is to exempt media corporations from
campaign expenditure regulations. Yet if Congress does this, then the Court
claims that Congress has engaged in unconstitutional speaker discrimination
by treating one group of speakers differently from another. The other option,
however, is to regulate the campaign expenditures of all corporations, including
media corporations. But if Congress tries this approach, the Court accuses it of
violating basic press freedoms by interfering with the speech rights of the
media. Thus, in the words of Justice Stevens, under the majority’s constitutional
framework, Congress is “damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t.”3
† Associate Professor of Law, the University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank
T.J. Striepe and the University of Georgia Law School librarians for their research assistance.
1 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
2 Id. at 474 n.75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3 Id.; see also id. (“If the legislature gives media corporations an exemption from electioneering
regulations that apply to other corporations, it violates the newly minted First Amendment rule
against identity-based distinctions. If the legislature does not give media corporations an exemption,

(253)

254

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

[Vol. 164: 253

More specifically, here is how the media exemption problem worked in
Citizens United: That case involved a federal law prohibiting corporations and
unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent
expenditures for speech expressly advocating for or against a candidate.4 Like
many campaign finance laws throughout the country, this law included an
exemption for the media’s news stories, commentaries, and editorials.5
In the view of the majority, this media exemption raised significant
constitutional problems. It was unfair, they argued, to allow government
regulation of some corporate speakers—nonmedia corporations—but not of
media corporations.6 At the same time, however, because the news media’s
political speech falls at the core of our First Amendment protections, if a law
regulated all corporations, including media corporations, it would violate the
First Amendment.7
Therefore, under the Court’s reasoning, the government may not regulate
only some corporations, and it also may not regulate all of them. As Justice
Stevens explained, “[t]he only way out of this invented bind: no regulations
whatsoever.”8
The media exemption dilemma in campaign finance law is nothing new,
but Citizens United appears to have solidified it. In his recent book, Plutocrats
United, Professor Richard Hasen declares the media exemption issue to be
“the third rail of the campaign finance debate.”9 Campaign finance reform
advocates, he argues, have found themselves in a no-win situation: “Say that
there should be an exception, and you run the risk of inconsistency or outright
hypocrisy; say there should not be an exception and you are considered too
extreme.”10 Seeing no way out, Hasen notes, they often choose to “simply
ignore [] or quickly gloss over” the problem.11
Yet the question of how to treat the press in campaign finance law can no
longer be ignored. For the discussion to move forward, it is necessary to
determine whether Congress, without running afoul of the First Amendment,
it violates the First Amendment rights of the press. The only way out of this invented bind: no
regulations whatsoever.”).
4 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006) (section subsequently transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30118 (West 2015)).
5 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2006) (section subsequently transferred to 52 U.S.C.A.
§ 30101(9)(B)(i) (West 2015)) (exempting by definition “any news story, commentary, or editorial
distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political
committee, or candidate”).
6 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion).
7 Id. at 353.
8 Id. at 474 n.75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9 RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 127 (2016).
10 Id. at 126.
11 Id.
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can ever regulate the political speech of nonmedia speakers. Left
unchallenged, the faulty logic of the Citizens United majority will always favor
corporations’ speech interests in campaign expenditures over the public’s
interests in reducing the influence of big money in politics, promoting
self-government or increasing political equality.
Thus it is critical to determine whether, in a post-Citizens United world,
there is a way out of the campaign finance media exemption box.
The answer is, quite simply, yes. Exempting the press from campaign
finance regulations is not the impenetrable quandary the Citizens United
majority made it appear. In fact, the solution is quite obvious as soon as the
fundamental flaw of the majority’s logic is understood. That flaw is the
Court’s failure to recognize that the press is different from other types of
speakers. The press is different textually. It is different historically. And it is
different functionally. Once the special constitutional role of the press is
acknowledged, the media exemption problem loses its force.
Objections to media exemptions focus on two issues—justification and
definition. The justification criticisms question whether there are acceptable
reasons why we should grant protections to certain types of speakers (those
that are members of the press) and not to others.12 The definition arguments,
meanwhile, claim that there is no acceptable way to identify which speakers
should be allowed to claim a media exemption and which should not.13
12 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (“The inherent worth
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”); id. at 782 n.18 (noting that
granting institutional press greater protection would conflict with the “informational purpose of the
First Amendment,” and surmising that the people may be as interested in hearing the views of the
appellants as those of a media corporation); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972) (“The
informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also
performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost
any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the
public, that he relies on confidential sources of information, and that these sources will be silenced
if he is forced to make disclosures before a grand jury.”); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938) (“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily
embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty,
as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest.”); Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819, 1833 (“[The Citizens United majority
implied that] media corporations are elitist, wield political power and influence disproportionate to
their public support, and are no more deserving of ‘special’ protection than any other corporation.”).
13 See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704-05 (“Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define
those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure . . . .”); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156-58 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Sentelle, J., concurring)
(highlighting the definitional problems with privileging the press and surveying the various and
incompatible ways that state legislatures define who is protected under their shield statutes);
Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 438
(2013) (“There is no coherent way to distinguish the institutional press from others who disseminate
information and opinion to the public through communications media.”); David B. Sentelle, Freedom
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In Citizens United, the majority made both types of arguments. First, the
majority claimed that there was no justification for differing treatment of
media speakers vis-à-vis nonmedia speakers. If Congress’s purpose in
regulating corporate political spending was to prevent wealthy corporations
from distorting the political debate, the Court reasoned, then many media
corporations, which have also accumulated immense wealth from the
corporate form, should also be included.14 Placing regulatory burdens on
certain corporate speakers but not on the press, the majority also argued,
would distort the public dialogue in favor of the media’s views, which do not
always mirror the views of the public at large.15
A similar justification argument is foreseeable under a political equality
rationale. That is, if the purpose of a regulation is to promote equal voices,
failure to exempt the press would allow the media to have a louder voice than
nonmedia speakers. And yet simply regulating media corporations in addition
to other corporations was also not an answer, according to the Court, because
suppressing the political speech of the press would be contrary to the original
understanding of the First Amendment.16
But as Justice Stevens pointed out in his Citizens United dissent, these
arguments overlook the significant textual and historic evidence establishing
that the press can and should be treated differently. The most vital piece of
the constitutional puzzle, he explained, was not the First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause but the one that follows—the Press Clause.17 By specifically
protecting the freedom of the press, Justice Stevens stated, the Framers
demonstrated “why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press,
might be able to claim special First Amendment status.”18 Indeed, as Justice
Potter Stewart famously pointed out, through the Press Clause the Framers
made the media “the only organized private business that is given explicit
constitutional protection.”19
Beyond the clear textual protection for the press, the history of the Press
Clause also demonstrates its uniqueness. The framing generation placed a
substantial premium on press liberties, even over speech rights.20 James

of the Press: A Liberty for All or a Privilege for a Few?, 2013–2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 15, 19 (“Perhaps
it is this problem of definition raised by Chief Justice Burger that best illustrates the difficulty with
the proposition that the freedom of the press protects a class of persons rather than all persons.”).
14 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351-52 (2010) (majority opinion).
15 Id. at 352-53.
16 Id. at 353.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
18 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19 Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975).
20 See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 508 (1983)
(“The textual antecedents of the first amendment reflect a greater concern with press than with
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Madison declared press freedom to be of the “choicest privileges of the
people” and proposed language to make press freedom “inviolable.”21 It was
hailed as “one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty”22 and “essential to the
security of freedom in a state.”23
Numerous Supreme Court decisions, moreover, have demonstrated the
special constitutional status of the press by detailing the unique functions that
the press fulfills in our democracy. These functions include informing the
public of newsworthy matters24 and restraining the government and the
powerful.25 Not only does the Constitution recognize and safeguard the
press’s role in furthering these structural goals, but the Court also has
recognized the ability of legislatures to provide additional press protections.26
Again, in the words of Justice Stevens, when legislators enact media
exemptions they are simply recognizing “the unique role played by the
institutional press in sustaining public debate.”27
The Citizens United majority also raised a definitional objection. It
asserted that, even accepting “the most doubtful proposition” that media
corporations could be exempted from campaign finance laws, it is unclear which
corporations should be considered “media” corporations.28 Thanks to modern
technology, the majority stated, “the line between the media and others who
wish to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”29
The definitional argument against a media exemption, however, is not as
unworkable as the Court described it. When it comes to recognizing
constitutional protections, the fact that courts will be called on to determine
some potentially blurry boundaries is not a death sentence. Courts, of course,
speech.”); see also Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2016)
(detailing the historical evidence that the framing generation highly valued press freedoms).
21 JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY
AMERICAN JOURNALISM 166 (1988).
22 Virginia Declaration of Rights § 12 (1776), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 234, 235 (1971).
23 Massachusetts Declaration of Rights art. XVI (1780), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 22,
at 339, 342.
24 See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (declaring “an untrammeled
press [to be] a vital source of public information”).
25 See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (stating that “[t]he press plays a
unique role as a check on government abuse”). See generally Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause,
48 GA. L. REV. 729, 753-55 (2014).
26 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972) (“At the federal level, Congress has
freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to
fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned
and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate.”).
27 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 417 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
28 Id. at 352-53 (majority opinion).
29 Id. at 352.
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deal with ambiguous terminology and gray areas in constitutional law on a
regular basis without being forced to declare the entire undertaking undoable.
The issue of free speech alone, for example, has forced the Court to draw
surely imperfect lines between all kinds of protected and unprotected
speech—including commercial speech, obscenity, fighting words, incitement,
and threats. And the Court has maneuvered through issues of content-based
and content-neutral regulations, questions of speech versus conduct, as well
as problems of overbreadth and vagueness. There is simply no reason to
assume that when it comes to defining the press, the task of constitutional
interpretation is unusually difficult.30
The media exemption problem is only a problem if the Court continues
to ignore the significant constitutional evidence of press uniqueness. Non-press
speakers simply are not—and never have been treated as—the same as the
press. And, as Justice Stevens stressed in Citizens United: “Once one accepts
that much, the intellectual edifice of the majority opinion crumbles.”31
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30 For a discussion of how to distinguish press speakers from non-press speakers, see Sonja R.
West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434 (2014).
31 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

